Section 10. That no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.
Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 30.
(1951) Provisions of 1875 constitution requiring unanimous consent of stockholders for issuance of preferred stock did not create vested right in stockholder so that action of corporation created before adoption of corporation code in 1943 and before adoption of 1945 constitution, which accepted corporation code under § 351.025, in issuing preferred stock on vote of three-fourths of stockholders, was not violative of due process provisions of constitution. Midland Truck Lines v. Atwood, 362 Mo. 397, 241 S.W.2d 903.
(1952) Consent of the state to be sued cannot be implied from this section. Kleban v. Morris, 363 Mo. 7, 247 S.W.2d 832.
(1953) Earnings tax imposed by city of St. Louis under statutory authority held not violative of the due process and uniform tax provisions of the constitution. Walters v. City of St. Louis, 364 Mo. 56, 259 S.W.2d 377.
(1953) Since constitutional guarantees of sections 10 and 22, Article I of the Constitution are for protection against governmental action, and not applicable to acts of individuals as between themselves, contention that labor union's action denied such rights to one of its members does not raise a constitutional question so as to give supreme court jurisdiction of cause. Junkins v. Local Union No. 6313, etc. (Mo.), 263 S.W.2d 337.
(1954) Land Clearance for Redevelopment Law (RSMo, § 99.300 et seq.) does not contravene this provision of the Constitution. State on Inf. Dalton v. Land Clearance for Redev. Auth., 364 Mo. 974, 270 S.W.2d 44.
(1957) The Uniform Support of Dependents' Law is not violative of the due process or retrospective law provisions of the constitution. Ivey v. Ayers (Mo.), 301 S.W.2d 790.
(1958) Where on review court of appeals set aside suspension of real estate dealer's license for violation of specific statutory provisions but remanded case to commission for the assessment of penalty for violation of another provision, further notice and hearing were unnecessary before penalty was assessed either under due process requirement or under administrative procedure law. Dittmeier v. Missouri Real Estate Comm. (Mo.), 316 S.W.2d 1; Cert. den. 358 U.S. 941, 79 S.Ct. 347.
(1958) Daughter adopted by testator's daughter in 1909 held to be entitled to share in distribution of remainder of trust estate to "lineal descendants" of testator under will executed in 1927 and where remainder vested in 1955 and such ruling did not render acts passed subsequent to testator's death and prior to vesting of remainder which qualified adopted daughter as lineal descendant violative of §§ 10 and 13 of Art. I of the Constitution. Commerce Trust Co. v. Weed (Mo.), 318 S.W.2d 289.
(1959) Juvenile Code 1957 sustained against contention that it is so vague, indefinite and uncertain as to make unascertainable the standards of conduct required and is thereby violative of the due process provision of the constitution. Minor Children of F.B. v. Caruthers (A.), 323 S.W.2d 397.
(1959) Exclusion of work done for levee and drainage districts from operation of Prevailing Wage Act held not unreasonable classification or special law. City of Joplin v. Industrial Comm. (Mo.), 329 S.W.2d 687.
(1960) Where bridge over railroad right-of-way was constructed under agreement between land developer and railroad, then accepted as part of a county road and finally included within a city, the Public Service Commission could order its reconstruction and apportion the costs thereof between the railroad and city without taking property without due process. State ex rel. C.B. & Q. RR Co. v. Public Serv. Comm. (Mo.), 334 S.W.2d 54.
(1960) Since liquor business does not stand on same plane as other commercial activities and is not lawful except as authorized by statute, statute which does not require a hearing before refusal to renew license for liquor business held valid. Pinzino v. Supervisor of Liquor Control (Mo.), 334 S.W.2d 20.
(1961) Provision of use tax law exempting use of merchandise not readily obtainable in Missouri held void for indefiniteness and uncertainty. Missouri Pacific RR Co. v. Morris (Mo.), 345 S.W.2d 52.
(1961) The striking of the defendant's pleadings in a divorce action because of his failure to pay alimony pendente lite and suit money held to be denial of due process of law. Richman v. Richman (Mo.), 350 S.W.2d 733.
(1961) Ordinance adopted by county operating under a constitutional charter which required the fluoridation of the water supply to be used throughout the county held not violative of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution or this due process provision. Readey v. St. Louis County Water Company (Mo.), 352 S.W.2d 622.
(1962) City zoning ordinance adopted under §§ 89.010 to 89.140 held valid as against contention that it constituted an unwarranted delegation of legislative discretion to an administrative board without sufficient standards or guides. Porporis v. City of Warson Woods (Mo.), 352 S.W.2d 605.
(1962) Ordinance of the City of St. Louis which required any real estate agent when placing a "For Sale" sign on any real estate to indicate on the sign the zoning area in which the property was located held valid. City of St. Louis v. Green (Mo.), 353 S.W.2d 606.
(1962) Act prohibiting discriminatory practices in the sale of milk and prohibiting its sale at less than cost held not violative of the equal rights and due process provisions of the constitution. Borden Company v. Thomason (Mo.), 353 S.W.2d 735.
(1963) Provision excepting "provisions or other articles of immediate necessity" from Sunday sales prohibition held to render the statute so vague and indefinite that it is incapable of rational enforcement and therefore void. Harvey v. Priest (Mo.), 366 S.W.2d 324.
(1963) Proviso of § 155.050 providing for apportionment of assessed valuation of aircraft of airlines to city owning and operating an airport outside its corporate limits in which airlines had arrivals and departures, and city's attempted levy of tangible personal property taxes on such apportioned valuation were invalid and void as violation of due process clauses of state and federal constitutions. American Airlines, Inc. v. City of St.Louis (Mo.), 368 S.W.2d 161.
(1963) Refusal to rezone vacant tract classified as residential to commercial was unreasonable and arbitrary and infringed plaintiff's rights under due process clause where maintenance of residential zoning bore no substantial relationship to public health, safety, morals or general welfare and where property was three times more valuable as commercial property and was not suited to residential development in view of adjacent commercial development and traffic conditions. Huttig v. City of Richmond Heights (Mo.), 372 S.W.2d 833.
(1964) Sunday sales law upheld against charge that it was unconstitutional as being a special law, containing unreasonable, arbitrary and discriminatory classifications in violation of plantiffs' right to equal rights and opportunities under the law; and depriving plaintiffs of liberty of property without due process of law. GEM Stores, Inc. v. O'Brien (Mo.), 374 S.W.2d 109.
(1964) Where taxable property lying within the boundaries of a county library district was incorporated by annexation into the boundaries of a city which had a tax supported free public library, held that the property was subject to the taxing power of both districts and such interpretation did not violate Article X, § 3, and Article I, §§ 2, 10, 26 and 28 of the Missouri Constitution. St. Louis County Library District v. Hopkins (Mo.), 375 S.W.2d 71.
(1964) Picketing of funeral home which was in part for the purpose of preventing owners from personally doing any embalming in their own business was for an unlawful purpose. Baue v. Embalmers Federal Labor Union No. 21301 (Mo.), 376 S.W.2d 230.
(1964) Constitutionality of Sunday Sales Act upheld against the charge that it is so vague and indefinite that citizens cannot ascertain or be informed of its meaning contrary to the due process provision of Art. I, § 10 of the Constitution, and in violation of the right of a person accused in a criminal proceeding to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him as provided by Art. I, § 18(a) of the constitution. State ex rel. Eagleton v. McQueen (Mo.), 378 S.W.2d 449.
(1964) Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction of appeal from Public Service Commission's order directing railroad to cancel tariff item on theory of issue requiring construction of due process clause of constitution where actual question was whether or not the commission exceeded its statutory authority. State ex rel. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Company v. Public Service Commission (Mo.), 378 S.W.2d 459.
(1964) Validity of city ordinance requiring licensing of television and radio servicemen upheld against charges that it violated due process and equal protection clauses of state and federal constitutions and the "special law" prohibition of the state constitution. McClellan v. Kansas City (Mo.), 379 S.W.2d 500.
(1966) Fact that same agency, State Board of Registration for Healing Arts, both prosecuted and decided the case does not by itself deprive appellant of right of due process of law. Rose v. State Board of Registration for Healing Arts (Mo.), 397 S.W.2d 570.
(1966) When the legislative body of a city chooses to delegate to itself the discretionary power to enforce its special permit regulation, it acts administratively in passing on applications for such permits and is thus enforcing the legislation previously enacted; and such discretion must be circumscribed by sufficient standards to require it to be reasonably, not arbitrarily, exercised. State v. City of Winchester (Mo.), 400 S.W.2d 47.
(1972) City ordinance which prohibited minors, with certain exceptions, entering premises where liquor was sold by the drink except those premises where sales of prepared meals and food totalled 50% of the gross income during the three calendar months upheld against charge that it was unconstitutional in that it unreasonably classified licensed establishments on a basis that had no relation to any evil sought to be controlled. Waldrop v. Burge (Mo.), 476 S.W.2d 537.
(1972) The right of a party-litigant to depose witnesses is an absolute right and act of trial court in divorce action in quashing defendant's deposition subpoenas because he was delinquent in paying pendente lite allowances was error as it deprived him of that right and substantially limited the range of his defense. Norkunas v. Norkunas (A.), 480 S.W.2d 92.
(1973) Ordinance making registered owner liable for improper parking of vehicle does not result in failure of due process. City of Kansas City v. Herty Corp. (Mo.), 499 S.W.2d 449.
(1974) Held that classification of marijuana with more dangerous drugs is not violative of equal protection or due process. State v. Burrow (Mo.), 514 S.W.2d 585.
(1976) Delay between commission of the offense of carrying a concealed weapon and defendant's arrest thereon or filing of information did not abridge defendant's right to speedy trial, nor did it violate his right of due process since no prejudice was demonstrated by the delay. State v. Odzark (A.), 532 S.W.2d 45.
(1976) Issuance of a repossessed title by director of revenue pursuant to § 301.215, to secured creditor who had repossessed automobile by self help under power granted in security agreement did not constitute significant participation by state such as to come within legal definition of "state action", thus due process was not involved and statute was not unconstitutional. Smith v. Spradling (Mo.), 532 S.W.2d 202.
(1976) Denial to members of a religious society of whom only one was a priest and the others were laymen who did not have the religious ministry as a primary and regular vocation, of an occupancy permit to occupy an existing residence as their home in an area zoned single family residential was not a denial of their constitutional rights under the freedom-of-worship and due process clauses of the Missouri Constitution. Association for Educational Development v. Hayward (Mo.), 533 S.W.2d 579.
(2001) Statute of limitations in real property inverse condemnation cases cannot be shorter than that required for entity with power of eminent domain to obtain a prescriptive easement on the property, which is ten years. Shade v. Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission, 69 S.W.3d 503 (Mo.App. W.D.).
(1952) Zoning ordinance prohibiting construction of residences on tracts of not less than three acres and forbidding institutional use except by special permit, where same is necessary to conform to general zoning plan, is not invalid. Flora Realty & Inv. Co. v. City of Ladue, 362 Mo. 1025, 246 S.W.2d 771.
(1952) Procedure under § 375.560 taking over insurance company by superintendent because of cessation of business held not violative of due process provision of constitution. Leggett v. Gen. Indem. Exch., 363 Mo. 273, 250 S.W.2d 710.
(1954) Order of state Public Service Commission that railroad company contribute to installation of and maintain flashing light signal at grade crossing found hazardous by such commission does not deprive company of property without due process. State ex rel. Wabash Railroad Co. v. Public Service Comm. (Mo.), 273 S.W.2d 334.
(1957) City ordinance prohibiting sale of intoxicating liquors by wholesaler when retailer was delinquent in his accounts to any wholesaler held not violative of due process. Passler v. Johnson (Mo.), 304 S.W.2d 903.
(1958) Contention that statute providing for apportionment of costs of construction, maintenance and operation of crossing was violative of the due process clauses of the state and federal constitution held without merit. State ex rel. State Highway Comm. v. Conrad (Mo.), 310 S.W.2d 871.
(1958) Zoning of area as local business district and restricting use of owner's property as supper club was not violation of this section as classification was reasonable when considered as part of comprehensive zoning plan of the city and when, in the district itself, there were thirty-five residences and only three or four nonconforming uses. Downing v. City of Joplin (Mo.), 312 S.W.2d 81.
(1959) City ordinance regulating the installation and repair of warm air furnaces held not to leave board with uncontrolled discretion as to licensing or to deny due process. Ross v. City of Kansas City (Mo.), 328 S.W.2d 610.
(1954) Act authorizing hospitalization of mentally ill person (Laws 1953, p. 647) on application of third person and certification of two physicians and also authorizing officer to take such person into custody and to deliver him to hospital without notice and opportunity to be heard denies due process. State ex rel. Fuller v. Mullinax, 364 Mo. 858, 269 S.W.2d 72.
(1954) Insofar as paragraph 3 of § 537.020 provides for proceedings against personal representative of deceased nonresident without adequate notice to him it denies due process. Harris v. Bates (Mo.), 270 S.W.2d 763.
(1957) Service of process by publication in class proceedings to escheat unclaimed excess insurance premiums in registry of court met statutory requirements and did not violate due process by not specifically advising defendants to file answer. State v. Goodbar (Mo.), 297 S.W.2d 525.
(1957) Where after a number of continuance cases was peremptorily set for trial on specified date, and plaintiff's attorney withdrew before that date, due process required that other attorneys could appear for plaintiff on the date peremptorily set without agreeing to immediate trial. Dismissal for failure to prosecute in such circumstances held improper. Magerstadt v. LaForge (Mo.), 303 S.W.2d 130.
(1958) The provision of § 506.210 authorizing service upon the executor or administrator of a deceased nonresident does not violate the due process provisions of the state or federal constitutions. Brooks v. National Bank of Topeka, 251 F.2d 37.
(1958) Section 506.210, amended in 1955, held not violative of due process provisions in conferring jurisdiction on Missouri courts over administrators and executors of estates of nonresidents. State ex rel. Sullivan v. Cross (Mo.), 314 S.W.2d 889.
(1979) Notice of foreclosure authorized by municipal land reutilization law through publication, and a letter to last known property owner of record is not violative of due process. Collector of Revenue of the City of St. Louis v. Parcels of Land Encumbered with Delinquent Tax Liens (Mo.), 585 S.W.2d 486.
(1956) Prohibition in the Supreme Court is governed by the general law on the subject rather than by the civil code. Where writ was directed to judge of multiple judge circuit who made order which would result in excess of jurisdiction it bound all judges of such circuit and afforded due process. State ex rel. Siegel v. Strother, 365 Mo. 861, 289 S.W.2d 73.
(1959) Where attorney who was retained by defendant in criminal case subsequently became prosecuting attorney, and as such opposed continuance of case sought by defendant and prepared instructions in case tried by assistant, the conviction of defendant would be set aside as prejudicial. State v. Burns (Mo.), 322 S.W.2d 736.
(1952) Due process does not require change of venue or right to disqualify judge in a criminal contempt case. Osborne v. Purdome (Mo.), 250 S.W.2d 159.
(1953) Where defendant of low-level intelligence confessed guilt under circumstances indicating that confession was coerced by inspired fear, a promise of protection and daily interrogation over long period of detention, use of confession in his trial was violative of due process clause of constitution. State v. Bradford (Mo.), 262 S.W.2d 584.
(1955) Section 556.285, which makes person convicted more than three times of larceny guilty of grand larceny on conviction of a subsequent larceny held valid against challenger based on the due process, equal protection and ex post facto provisions of the constitution. State v. King (Mo.), 275 S.W.2d 310.
(1955) Supreme Court Rule No. 27.26 is similar to § 2255, 28 U.S.C.A., and, in accordance with judicial construction of that section, a motion alleging that individual was convicted by perjured testimony knowingly procured by the prosecution, stated facts showing denial of due process and, therefore, sufficient to require hearing. State v. Eaton (Mo.), 280 S.W.2d 63.
(1960) In prosecution for rape where defendant entered into an agreement approved by the court by which he was to be relieved of being tried on two other rape charges by accepting the decision of his counsel not to appeal from his conviction on the charge tried, he had no valid claim of lack of due process or equal protection of the laws. State v. Johnson (Mo.), 336 S.W.2d 668.
(1961) Where search warrants for obscene matter were in the language of the statute, specified no publications and left to the individual judgment of the police officer the selection of what he regarded as obscene publications, they failed to provide due process and were invalid. Marcus v. Search Warrants of Property, etc., 367 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct. 1708.
(1964) Failure to furnish defendant in prosecution for first degree robbery with free depositions was not a violation of his constitutional rights. State v. Aubuchon (Mo.), 381 S.W.2d 807.
(1964) Refusal by court to require production of police report and statement made to warrant officer by police officer was not abuse of discretion and violation of defendant's constitutional rights where there was no showing that report or statement was of such nature that without it defendant's trial would be fundamentally unfair. State v. Aubuchon (Mo.), 381 S.W.2d 807.
(1964) Failure to appoint counsel to represent defendant at preliminary examination where he pleaded not guilty held not to deprive him of due process of law nor equal protection of the law. State v. Phelps (Mo.), 384 S.W.2d 616.
(1966) As there is no constitutional requirement that there be a transcript of the testimony in a preliminary hearing, nor even a constitutional requirement that a preliminary hearing be held, defendant had no constitutional right to have a transcript of preliminary hearing. State v. Maxwell (Mo.), 400 S.W.2d 156.
(1966) Defendant in criminal case has no constitutional right to examine the police record, if any, of complaining witness. State v. Maxwell (Mo.), 400 S.W.2d 156.
(1967) Court's compelling defendant of limited education to go on trial for felony without counsel immediately upon the withdrawal without notice of his employed counsel resulted in a denial of due process of law. State v. Martin (Mo.), 411 S.W.2d 215.
(1967) If one confession statement or admission is simply part of one continuous process in which several confessions are obtained, all are invalid. State v. Linder (Mo.), 412 S.W.2d 412.
(1971) Where police station identification, following warning, occurred within 45 minutes after purse snatching and on-scene identification, following warning, and nothing took place at police station that had not already occurred at on-scene identification, the in-court identification could not be found to have been tainted by illegal extrajudicial identification at police station. State v. Grayson (Mo.), 467 S.W.2d 891.
(1972) There was no denial of due process based on alleged unfairness of one-to-one confrontation between accused and identifying witness shortly after commission of crime where identification was not used at trial; nor was there denial of due process based on police station lineups without the suspect being informed that their purpose was possible identification or that he was entitled to have counsel present or without obtaining a waiver of his right to counsel when lineups occurred shortly after crime and long before information was filed. Robinson v. State (Mo.), 482 S.W.2d 492.
(1973) Defendant denied due process when sole prosecution witness had answered in effect that he had received no inducement to testify when in fact murder charge against him had been dismissed immediately prior to trial. State v. McClain (Mo.), 498 S.W.2d 798.
(1967) The Public Service Commission is without power to order a telephone company to provide services in an area in which it has not offered, proffered or undertaken to provide service because such compulsion would be tantamount to an appropriation of the telephone company's property to a public service to which it has not dedicated such property, a taking of private property for public use without just compensation. State v. Public Service Commission (Mo.), 416 S.W.2d 109.
(1967) Attempt by public service commission to order a telephone company to provide services in an area which it has not offered, proffered or undertaken to serve is tantamount to an appropriation of private property for public use without just compensation. State v. Public Service Commission (Mo.), 416 S.W.2d 109.
(1968) Held that use of jury forms with variance in type, size, and style for guilty form and not guilty form did not constitute a comment on the evidence or a denial of due process or equal protection. State v. Dennison (Mo.), 428 S.W.2d 573.