Section 28. That private property shall not be taken for private use with or without compensation, unless by consent of the owner, except for private ways of necessity, and except for drains and ditches across the lands of others for agricultural and sanitary purposes, in the manner prescribed by law; and that when an attempt is made to take private property for a use alleged to be public, the question whether the contemplated use be public shall be judicially determined without regard to any legislative declaration that the use is public.
Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 20.
(1954) Land clearance for Redevelopment Law (RSMo, Sec. 99.300 et seq.), in authorizing the acquisition of sound structures and vacant land by city does not constitute taking private property for private use. State on Inf. Dalton v. Land Clearance for Redev. Auth., 364 Mo. 974, 270 S.W.2d 44.
(1954) In determining the validity of slum clearance legislation granting power of eminent domain, section 28, Article I, and section 21, Article VI, are to be construed together and as so construed a legislative finding that a blighted or insanitary area exists so as to authorize the exercise of the power of eminent domain is conclusive on the courts in absence of allegation and proof that the finding is arbitrary, or induced by fraud, collusion or bad faith. State on Inf. Dalton v. Land Clearance for Redevelopment Auth., 364 Mo. 974, 270 S.W.2d 44; (1954) Land Clearance for Redev. Authority v. City of St. Louis (Mo.), 270 S.W.2d 58.
(1954) Fact that owner of all of lots on one side of proposed street built homes to sell and undertook grading of street does not establish that ordinance for grading of street was not for public use. In The Matter of Proceedings to Grade North Elmwood (Mo.), 270 S.W.2d 863.
(1961) The conveyance of property acquired by eminent domain in slum clearance project to university controlled by religious denomination held not to constitute the taking of private property for private purposes. Kintzelle v. City of St. Louis (Mo.), 347 S.W.2d 695.
(1962) Highway commission had authority to condemn easement to provide a substitute location for pipelines which was necessary for interstate highway construction as the taking was for public purpose and was not in violation of Article III, Sec. 38(a) since state received compensation in surrender of existing right-of-way. State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Eakin (Mo.), 357 S.W.2d 129.